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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

FRED BROADBENT,
Applicant,

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH,

Case No. 920409-CA

vs.

Defendant.

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter
pursuant to Article VIII, section 5 of the Utah Constitution, and
Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-2a-3 (2) (a) (1990) 35-1-82.53 (2) (1988), 351-86 (1988), and 63-46b-14 (1988).
a

final

order

wherein

the Utah

This is an appeal from part of
State

Industrial

Commission

determined that Petitioner Fred Broadbent ("Broadbent") suffered an
industrial injury on October 6, 1982. Due to conflicting medical
opinions the Administrative Law Judge, Timothy Allen, ("ALJ")
referred Broadbent to a medical panel.

On December 10, 1991, a

medical panel determined that Broadbent had a twenty-three percent
(23%) impairment rating due to the accident.

However, the ALJ

ordered that interest be paid only from December 23, 1991. On May
29, 1992, the Industrial Commission affirmed the ALJ's order.
Petition for Review was timely filed on June 23, 1992.
1

A

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL
Did

the

Utah

Industrial

Commission

err

in

choosing

December 23, 1991 as the starting date for interest on an award for
an injury on October 6, 1982, where the applicable statute provides
for interest from the date when the benefit would have been payable
but for the dispute and when the insurance carrier had use of Mr.
Broadbent's money for an extended time?
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
A statute found in Utah Code Ann. §3 5-1-78 (1988) and
Rule 490-1-12(b) (Utah Admin. Code 1991) are dispositive of this
appeal.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Mr. Broadbent suffered an industrial accident on October
6, 1982.
1983.

(R. 1, 59)
(R. 186)

He was released to return to work on June 9,
The insurance carrier paid

temporary

disability payments ("TTD") through the same day.
the next

few years Mr. Broadbent received

ratings from various doctors.
160)

(R. 14)

several

total
Over

impairment

(R. 186, 225, 231, 262, 286, and

The differences in medical opinion and inability of the

parties to agree necessitated the appointment of a medical panel.
(R. 59)
On December 10, 1991, the medical panel determined that
2

Broadbent had a twenty-three percent (23%) impairment rating.

(R.

56) On March 9, 1992, the ALJ entered his Order awarding Broadbent
a twenty-three percent (23%) permanent partial impairment rating.
(R. 59-61)

However, the ALJ ordered defendants to pay interest at

8% only from December 23, 1991.

(R. 59-61)

Broadbent disputed the ALJ's order concerning the award
of interest.1

(R. 64-68)

He filed a timely Motion for Review.

(R. 64-68) On May 29, 1992, the Industrial Commission affirmed the
ALJ's order.
appeal.

(R. 113-120)

Broadbent then timely filed this

(R. 123)

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Broadbent sustained a serious back, shoulder, neck, and
rectum injury in an industrial accident on October 6, 1982 while
employed by Tolboe Construction Company, which was insured by
Industrial Indemnity.

(R. 1, 59) Richard M. Thomas, M.D., was one

of Broadbent's treating physicians.
surgery following the accident.

He performed the necessary

Dr. Thomas referred Broadbent to

Douglas B. Kirkpatrick, M.D. for additional treatment.

(R. 222)

Broadbent had been receiving chiropractic care from Dr.
Kelly B. Jarvis, B.S., D.C. prior to the industrial accident.
After the industrial accident he continued to see Dr. Jarvis, who
also treated him for the industrial accident.

Dr. Jarvis cleared

Interest is calculated at eight percent (8%) per annum. Mr. Broadbent's PPD weekly amount was $189.00. When his last PPD payment was due
on October 27, 1984, Mr. Broadbent was owed $13,562.62 in PPD payments and $460.33 in interest. Therefore, on October 27th every following year, Mr.
Broadbent was owed $1,085.00 in interest. Interest was due until approximately August 17, 1992 when defendant's tendered the amount ordered by the
Industrial Commission. Broadbent will be owed an approximate total of $8,929.66 in interest.

3

Broadbent for work as of June 9, 1983.
TTD through June 9, 1983.

(R. 14)

(R. 186)

Defendants paid

Following medical treatment,

Broadbent returned to work on September 1, 1983.

(R. 10)

Dr. Kirkpatrick, a neurosurgeon, gave Broadbent a twenty
percent (20%) impairment rating on April 23, 1984.

(R. 225)

The

record is silent as to why this case did not settle at the 20%
impairment rating.

Dr. Kirkpatrick then gave Broadbent a five

percent (5%) rating on September 5, 1984.

(R. 231)

Bruce F. Sorenson, M.D.f a neurosurgeon, was also one of
Brocidbent's treating physicians.

Dr. Sorenson gave Broadbent a

sixteen percent (16%) impairment rating on May 26, 1987.

(R. 262)

The record is silent as to why three years transpired between Dr.
Kirkpatrick's

impairment

rating

and

Dr.. Sorenson's

impairment

rating.
Broadbent wanted a second opinion so he went to Milton D.
Thomas, M.D.

On February 2, 1988 Dr. Thomas gave Broadbent an

impairment rating of fifteen percent (15%) .

(R. 286)

Broadbent

felt that he was more seriously impaired than either Dr. Thomas' or
Dr. Sorenson's impairment ratings.
On

June

4,

1987,

defendants

tendered

an

offer

settlement for the sixteen percent (16%) impairment rating.
14)

of
(R.

However, because Broadbent correctly believed he was more

seriously impaired, he rejected the offer.
On or about August

30, 1990 Broadbent

services of the law firm of Sykes and Vilos.

retained

the

Broadbent was then

evaluated by John M. Bender, M.D., a physiatrist, who gave him an
4

impairment rating of thirty-four percent (34%) on September 18,
1990.

(R. 160) Dr. Bender's rating included a twenty-four percent

(24%) impairment for physical disabilities.

(R. 160)

Because

Broadbent was experiencing Parkinson-like symptoms, Dr. Bender
included
rating.

a twelve percent

(12%) permanent physical

impairment

(R. 160) Broadbent then offered to settle for the twenty-

four percent

(24%) impairment rating.

(R. 15-16)

Defendants

refused this offer.
On December 10, 1991, a medical panel, ordered by the
Industrial Commission, awarded Broadbent a twenty-three percent
(23%) impairment rating.

(R. 56)

The medical panel stated that

the Parkinson-like symptoms were not a result of the industrial
accident.

(R. 55-56)

On March 9, 1992 the ALJ, in his Order,

adopted the medical panel's impairment rating of twenty-three
percent (23%).

(R. 59-61)

Judge Allen also ordered Broadbent's

compensation to be paid in a lump sum plus eight percent (8%)
interest per annum from December 23, 1991.

(R. 59-61)

Broadbent filed a Motion for Review on the payment of
interest.

(R. 64-68)

On May 29, 1992 the Industrial Commission

affirmed Judge Allen's Order.

(R. 113-120) The Commission stated:

The respondents argue that the ALJ was correct in
ordering that interest on the PPD award commenced on
December 23, 1991 since that was the date that the
liability of the respondents was first medically
determined. We agree with the respondents on this issue.
Petitioner timely filed his Petition for Review.

5

(R. 123)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The commission failed to correctly interpret and apply
Utah Code Ann. §35-1-78 (1988) and Rule 490-1-12(b) (Utah Admin.
Code 1991).

Consequently, it erroneously selected December 23,

1991 as the date when Broadbent's benefits became due and payable.
Broadbent was released to return to work on June 9, 1983.
This ended his temporary total disability
permanent partial disability (PPD).2

(TTD), and began his

Therefore, a correct reading

of the above Statute and Rule would mean that Broadbent's benefits
became due and payable the next day. Consequently, interest should
have been awarded from June 10, 1983, until the benefits were paid.

ARGUMENT
Standard of Review
The issue on appeal is a question of law.

In considering

a question of law, the reviewing Court affords no deference to the
Industrial Commissions
employs

legal conclusions.

a correction-of-error

standard.

Commission. 767 P.2d 524, 527 (Utah 1988).
scrutinize
appropriate

the

Commission's

order

to

Rather, this Court
Hurley

v.

Industrial

This Court must closely
determine

whether

legal principles were applisid when the

the

commission

2
Broadbent received temporary total disability payments from February 17, 1987 to and including March 8, 1987 and from August 14, 1986 through
and including August 27, 1986. This is 6.875 weeks. Naturally, interest would not accrue on the PPD during those few weeks. Consequently, Mr. Broadbent'*
interest would be reduced by $143.45.
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failed to award interest before December 23, 1991, pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 35-1-78.

POINT I
DID THE UTAH INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION ERR IN
CHOOSING DECEMBER 23,1991 AS THE STARTING DATE
FOR INTEREST ON AN AWARD FOR AN INJURY ON
OCTOBER 6, 1982, WHERE THE APPLICABLE STATUTE
PROVDES FOR INTEREST FROM THE DATE WHEN THE
BENEFIT WOULD HAVE BEEN PAYABLE BUT FOR THE
DISPUTE AND WHEN THE INSURANCE CARRIER HAD
USE OF APPLICANT'S MONEY FOR AN EXTENDED TIME?
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-78 establishes when interest is to
be paid:
Awards made by the Industrial Commission shall
include interest at the rate of 8% per annum
from the date when each benefit payment would
have otherwise become due and payable.
(Emphasis added)
Id. The Utah Supreme Court in Crenshaw v. Industrial Commission of
Utah, 712 P.2d 247 (Utah 1985), stated:
Interest on each payment when due is not
intended as a penalty or punishment for the
refusal to pay. The interest is charged to
the employees use of someone else's money.
The claimant is unable to make any use of the
money and the value of the benefit is
diminished when payment is delayed. Any such
delay in payment inevitably results in the
claimant subsidizing the employees insurer.
By Statute, interest must be paid on each
benefit payment which comprises an award from
the date the payment would have otherwise been
due and payable. (Emphasis added).
Id. at 250.
Furthermore,

§

35-1-78

applies

retroactively.

In

Marshall v. Industrial Commission 704 P.2d 581 (Utah 1985), the
7

Supreme Court stated:
Thus, it is clear that compensation for worker
disability is legislation for the public
welfare.
It is also clear that the statute
providing for interest on unpaid benefits was
a legislative attempt to remedy a serious
social problem: the depreciation of the value
of benefits as a result of non-receipt of the
weekly benefit for months, or perhaps years,
until a final determination of eligibility and
an award are made. To effect this purpose,
the legislature could only have intended this
remedy to apply to as broad a range of awards
as possible. (Emphasis added).
Id. at 583.
These cases teach several important principles:

for

example, interest on the award is mandatory, even though it is
"yecirs [before] ... a final determination of eligibility .... [is]
made." Also, the social reasons for interest include: compensation
to the employee for the "employer7s use of someone else's money";
establishing a disincentive for employer's delay; and preventing
the injustice of "the claimant subsidizing the employer's insurer."
The only question to be answered, here, is when did
Broadbent's benefits "otherwise become due and payable?"

The

Commission ruled:
interest . . . [should] commence on December
23, 1991 since that was the date that the
liability of the respondents was
first
medically determined. (Emphasis added).
(Exhibit A) .

The Commission claims reliance upon Rule 490-1-12

(Utah Admin. Code 1991).

However, that rule actually states:

For the purpose of interest calculation,
benefits shall become "due and payable" ... as
follows:

8

2. Permanent partial compensation shall be
due and payable on the next day following the
termination of temporary total disability.
However, where the condition is not fixed for
rating purposes, the interest shall commence
from the date the permanent partial impairment
can be medically determined.
Id.
June

(Emphasis added).
10,

1983.

impairment

rating

The day following termination of TTD was

Broadbent
from

Dr.

was

given

a twenty

Kirkpatrick

on

Therefore, on April 24, 1984, the condition was
for

rating

purposes"

as

of

that

date,

percent

April

23,

(20%)
1984.

"fixed [medically]

although

the

parties

disagreed on the rating.
The Commission focused on the less applicable language in
the second sentence of Rule 490-1-12(2) which states, "where the
condition is not fixed for rating purposes", (Emphasis added) but
ignored the most applicable first sentence.
sentence applies, the Commission

erroneously

Even if the second
decided

that the

medical panel's 23% impairment rating began with the date that the
liability of the respondents was first medically

determined.

However, the second sentence of Rule 490-1-12(2) clearly provides
that

interest

liability

accrues

"from the date the permanent

partial impairment can be medically determined" (Emphasis added)
not when it was determined. This sentence takes effect only "where
the condition is not fixed for rating purposes".

This must have

reference to the medical "condition" not being "fixed" or stable
for rating purposes.

Under such conditions, it would clearly be

unjust to impose interest on the employer, who is probably paying
TTD anyway.

Where the medical condition is not stable, the second
9

sentence of sub§(2) kicks in and says that interest commences from
the date

that permanent partial

impairment

"can

be medically

determined".
The second section of sub§(2) clearly does not come into
play in this case. The record shows that Mr. Broadbent was cleared
to

return

to work

disability

on

payments

June

ended

9,

on

1983

that

and

the

day.

temporary

By

total

defendant's

own

admission on the compensation agreement, the TTD ended on June 9,
1983.

Under

the

Commission's

own

rule,

that

constituted

"termination of temporary total disability" and his "permanent
partial compensation shall be due and payable on the next day
following ...".
It
impairment

is

not

ratings.

uncommon

for

In fact,

Broadbent

ratings on the following dates:
5, 1984

(5%);

September

18,

May 26, 1987
1990

(24%);

doctors

to

award

was given

April 23, 1984 (20%);
(16%);

and

February

December

varying

disability
September

2, 1988

23,

1991

(15%);

(23%).

Broetdbent's permanent partial impairment not only could be, but was
medically determined five times before the medical panel's rating!
However, the date that the amount of permanent partial impairment
was determined is not the standard set forth in the statute or the
rule.

The

statute,

anticipating

occasional

disputes

between

employees and insurance companies, provides that interest accrues
"from the date when each benefit payment would otherwise have
become due and payable".
prospectively,

Since that cannot always be determined

"otherwise"

must
10

refer

to

a

contemplated „

retrospective determination.

It is the only way it makes sense.

With that interpretation, no matter when the amount of PPD is
ultimately decided, the claimant is entitled to interest from the
date that the PPD should have been paid but for the dispute.

In

other words, but for the dispute over the amount, the payments
would have "otherwise become due and payable" on the day following
the termination of TTD.

In Broadbent's case, but for the dispute

and the delay, his benefits would have been "otherwise ... due and
payable" on the day following the termination of his TTD.

This

date was June 10, 1983. Therefore, Broadbent is owed interest from
June 10, 1983, the day following his first impairment rating.
The commission ignores the Supreme Court's explanation of
§ 35-1-78.

As shown above, insurance carriers must pay interest

when they have the use of an employee's money.

Also, "rainy such

delay in payment results in the claimant subsidizing the employer's
insured."

Crenshaw, at 250.

Furthermore, the Utah Supreme Court

stated that the employee's benefits must include interest even if
it takes years "until a final determination of eligibility and an
award are made."

Marshall, at 583.

This case is similar to Heaton v. Second Injury Fund, 796
P.2d 676 (Utah 1990) . In Heaton, the applicant was injured in 1975
and applied for permanent total disability in 1978.

The ALJ did

not rule on the application for permanent total disability.

The

employer's insurance carrier liability expired October 5, 1981.
They had been making all of their liability payments to Heaton.
Id. at 677.

In 1981 Heaton wrote a letter for clarification

11

concerning his claim.

The ALJ replied that Heaton should get a

report from a physician stating Heaton was unable to work and that
his condition had worsened.

In 1985 Heaton submitted a letter from

Dr. McNaught that supported his claim.
had not recovered

It also stated that Heaton

from surgeries performed

in 1976

and 1977.

Despite this, the ALJ and the commission determined Heaton was
totally disabled from the date of Dr. McNaught's examination, July
25, 1985.

The Utah Supreme Court reversed, ruling that Heaton was

totally disabled from October 6, 1981. Heaton, at 682.

The Court

then awards interest on all benefits from October 6, 1981, when the
second injury fund should have started making payments.

Id. at

677.
The claimants interpretation of the statute and rule is
consistent with the Utah Supreme Court ccises that have addressed
the issue. This interpretation also has a salutary and just effect
on industrial relations.

Consider the lopsided advantage for the

employer and the insurance company if the rule was any other way.
The employee receiving an on-the-job injury must go through the
Workers

Compensation

prohibited

under

system, with access of

normal

circumstances.

In

the courts being
that

system,

he

encounters sophisticated insurance companies, whose lawyers are
very knowledgeable about the act and adroit at finding loopholes.,
If the applicant even has an attorney (and many do not) , there are
relatively few claims attorneys who have substantial knowledge

12

about the Workers Compensation system.3

If this court establishes

a judicial interpretation that allows interest to begin only when
the final determination of a disputed PPI claim is made, then
employers and the insurance companies will have little incentive to
see that claims are promptly and resolutely determined.

It will

reward an employer or insurance company's unjust delay, since the
insurance

company

will

have use of

the

employee's

investment purposes, without paying any interest.

money

for

Such a ruling

would also have some very subtle - but deleterious - effects.

It

would lead to a "hard-ball" attitude in bargaining that would be
hard for the insurance company adjusters and representatives to
resist.

On a closed issue, they could simply tell the claimant to

"go jump in the lake", forcing the claimant to file for a hearing
and

lose

substantial

interest.

If

upheld,

the

Commission's

interpretation would be bad for industrial relations.
The defendant may say that this case is "different"
because Mr. Broadbent was allegedly hard to deal with.

Defendant's

may imply that it is partly Broadbent's own fault that this matter
has not been resolved sooner because he wouldn't take reasonable
offers, and that he allegedly made no effort to have his attorney
bring it to a head.4

These ingenuous arguments ignore important

facts and disregard the main issue.

Perhaps if Mr. Broadbent were

as sophisticated as the insurance company attorneys, he should be

1991-2 Yellow pages has approximately 34 listings for Workers Compensation attorneys, many of which are defense law firms.
Mr. Broadbent actually had three counsel of record at various times.
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held to a different standard.

However, one cannot forget that the

insurance company or its attorneys could have filed for a hearing
as early as 1983 or early 1984 if the matter was not progressing to
the point

of speedy

resolution.

The

defense

interpretation,

accepted by the Industrial Commission, gives the insurance company
no incentive to investigate and resolve the issue because, after
all, why kick a sleeping dog and possibly provoke a PPI claim that
Broadbent might otherwise forget to file, particularly if there is
no interest penalty.

Therefore, the employer and his insurance

cohorts can let the matter linger on for y€»ars, like they did here,
all the while using, investing and presumably making interest on
Broadbent's money. When Broadbent finally gets counsel that brings
the matter to a head, and a hearing, the insurance company can
claim that

it was Broadbent's

fault.

Under the

Commission's

erroneous interpretation, it would only pay Broadbent interest from
the day of the hearing, even though it has used Broadbent's money
for the intervening years.

This is unjust.

It will lead to great

mischief.
In the case sub iudice, it is undisputed that Broadbent
was injured on October 6, 1982.

It is undisputed he received a

release to return to work on June 9, 1983 and defendants paid his
TTD through June 9, 1983.

For a variety of reasons which include

employer delay, it has taken years for a final determination of PPI
and an award to be made.

Lastly, it is undisputed that Broadbent

has a twenty-three percent (23%) impairment rating "due to [sic]
industrial accident."

(R. 56)

Therefore, interest is due on all
14

benef its from, June 10 , 1983.

POINT II
INDUSTRIAL INDEMNITY, THE EMPLOYER'S
INSURANCE CARRIER, MADE NO TENDER OF THE
AMOUNT OWED TO MR. BROADBENT UNTIL AUGUST 17,
1992, WHEN THE AWARD WAS FINALLY PAID. SINCE
THE AMOUNT OF PERMANENT PARTIAL IMPAIRMENT
DUE MR. BROADBENT WAS FAIRLY DISPUTED UNTIL A
MEDICAL PANEL RESOLVED THE ISSUE IN 1991, AND
SINCE THE EMPLOYER MADE NO TENDER BEFORE
THAT TIME, INTEREST IS DUE BROADBENT FROM THE
DAY AFTER HIS TEMPORARY TOTAL DISABILITY
BEGAN, PURSUANT TO STATUTE AND A RULE OF THE
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION.
It
amount

is well

established

1 aw

i n IJ t a h

tha t

ten<Ier

of aii

in d i s p u t e arrests the accrual of interest, if t h e rightful

t e n d e r is not accepted.
running

of

interest, must

without conditions,
(1954) .

However, the t e n d e r , in order * > stop the
be made

r

- *

Sieverts v. W h i t e . 2 Utah 2d 3 5 1 , 273 P. 2d 974

T h i s rule is also applied to the arresting of interest on

judgments.

8 6 C.J.S., tender, §32(c) i(

page 57 5.

In t h e case sub judica, the m e d i c a l p a n e l d e t e r m i n e d that
Broadbent
percent.
TTD

was

entitled

to

a

PPI

award

of

twenty-three

T h e statute provides that that award t a k e s

payments

terminate.

From the termination

of

TTD

effect

(23%)
when

on J u n e

9,

1 9 8 3 , u n t i l approximately August 1 7 , 1 9 9 2 , (the d a t e of p a y m e n t ) ,
t h e r e w a s n e v e r a defense tender of the full a m o u n t owed.

There

w a s an offer for less thi-- • - .e ful I amount owed, but that doesn't
satisfy t h e requirements of the tender.
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The insurance company's perfidious attitude in this case
is amply demonstrated by the fact that the ALJ entered his 2 3%
award on March 9, 1992. The insurance company did not make payment
on that order until August 17, 1992, or 161 days after the award
was made. Such conduct by the insurance company hardly constitutes
a good faith tender that would arrest the accrual of interest, even
in part.
CONCLUSION
This court should reverse the Commission and find that
Broadbent is entitled to interest from June 10, 1983.

Otherwise

Broadbent would be subsidizing the insurance carrier, contrary to
the well established law of Utah.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 23rd day of September, 1992.
SYKES & VILOS, P.C.

•lUCpSNETF. MILL

Alzrorney f o r A p p e l l e e
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Benjamin A. Sims, Esq.
Industrial Commission of Utah
160 East 300 South
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ATTACHMENT "A"
Medical Panel Report

Gerald R. Moress M.D., RC.
NEUROLOGY

370 E. South Temple, Su.te 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone (801) 363-^386

December J 0, 199]
Timothy C. Allen
Administrative Law Judge
State of Utah
Industrial Commission of Utah
Adjudication Division
160 East 300 South
P.O. Box 510250
Salt Lake City, Utah 84151-0250

Re: Fred Broadbent
DOI: 10-6-82
Emp: Tolboe Construction
Company
Dear Judge Allen:
A Panel consisting of Gerald R. Moress, M.D.# Neurologist, and
Wallace E. Hess, M.D., Orthopaedist, performed a Panel
evaluation on Mr. Broadbent. The only x-rays available to the
Panel were x-rays from Dr. Jarvis in 1983, cervical and
dorsal. Complete spine x-rays and right shoulder xrays were
taken today to aid the Panel in its evaluation.
HISTORY OF INDUSTRIAL INJURY:
10/6/82, while wearing a hard hat, Mr. Broadbent, then age 42,

fell approximately 35 feet down an air shaft. During the fall
a 1/2 foot piece of pipe penetrated his rectum. He said that
he fell on his head and right shoulder.
According to the
Utah Valley Hospital Emergency Room record, there was no loss
of consciousness. When seen in the emergency room he had
contusions and abrasions of the right side of the face,
shoulder. His actual complaints in the emergency room were
pain in the right shoulder.
The admitting neurological
examination was normal. Perianal sensation was normal. He
was admitted under the care of surgeon, Richard Thomas.
During the hospitalization the perineum was debrided and
pieces of the coccyx and sacrum were excised. A diverting
sigmoid colostomy was performed. He was seen by neurosurgeon,
Douglas Kirkpatrick. Studies of his neck showed a fracture
at the spinous process of C5. Tomogram of the cervical spine
showetd just the spinous fracture though a very mild
compression fracture with rounding off of the anterior
superior corner of C5 body was described. He was discharged
on 10/18/82 and then readmitted by Dr. Thomas on 11/18/82 at
which time the colostomy was closed.
A follow up neurosurgical visit was paid to Dr. Kirkpatrick
on 2/2/83.
Dr. Kirkpatrick said that he had seen Mr.
Broadbent initially in the hospital because, of hand numbness.
He reiterated the history of his injury and said that when he
had fallen he had hit his hip, shoulder and forehead.
Numbness in the ring and little fingers of both hands had
dissipated. The doctor diagnosed at the time of the injury
cord contusion, concussion, C8 radiculopathy which will
improve him.
Conservative care was recommended without
surg€*ry. He had returned to Dr. Kirkpatrick because of shock
like feelings down his body whenever he flexed his neck.
These* were from the mid chest to his knees. Bowel, bladder
and sexual functions were normal. He had some neck pain with
2

rotation and some numbness into the fingers of both hands.
The doctor diagnosed cervical disc and spine injury with
intermittent
myelopathy.
A
cervical
myelogram
was
recommended. The patient demurred.
Beginning in 1983 Mr. Broadbent started to see chiropractor,
Kelly Jarvis, whom he had seen previously and continues to see
for chiropractic treatments.
In February of 1983 Mr. Broadbent referred himself to
neurosurgeon, Bruce Sorensen, who did numerous studies
including cervical myelogram, head CT scan and eventually MRI
scan of the brain and cervical spine. In fact, Dr. Sorensen
admitted him to LDS Hospital in 1983 then again in 1987, both
times for myelography. The cervical myelogram in February of
1987 showed that at C5-6 there had been a bulging that had
taken place since the previous 1983 examination and probably
represented a central herniation. The canal was described as
being large with a great deal of room around the cord. At
L4-5 a bulging disc was described. The brain MRI was normal.
When admitted in 1987 by Dr. Sorensen he was complaining of
some weakness of his left arm, vague left leg difficulties,
as well. Dr. Sorensen felt the myelography did not count for
his symptomatology.
Mr. Broadbent was seen again by Dr. Kirkpatrick in April of
1984 for a disability rating. He was most concerned about the
electrical shock feeling he was getting in his neck when he
flexed, the so called Lhermitte's sign. He was able to return
to work in July of 1983. He was also complaining of weakness
and numbness of his arms. Clonus of his left index finger was
described, decreased strength in the left triceps and biceps.
He had generalized numbness. He still had aching in his neck.
Some weakness of the upper extremities was found. Sensation
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was normal except for numbness in the right thumb and middle
fingers.
His gait and stance were normal.
He reviewed
myelogram that he felt was significant showing narrowing at
C5-6.
He diagnosed C5-6 disc injury with spondylosis and
myelopathy, C6-7 disc disease and spondylosis and gave him a
20% impairment rating. He recommended cervical surgery. He
returned to Dr. Kirkpatrick in July of 1984 because he said
he was worse, burning in his neck, intrascapular region, down
the back of both of his arms, clonus of the left index finger
was again described, cervical range of motion was diminished.
His gait and station were normal, he was admitted 8/14/84 to
Utah Valley Hospital and underwent complete myelography that
showed a disc bulge at C5-6.
There was a difference of
opinion between Dr. Kirkpatrick's interpretation of the study
and that of the radiologist. The radiologist felt that it was
not ci significant finding and Dr. Kirkpatrick thought it was
more significant.
The patient did not want to have any
surgery done. On 5/9/84 Dr. Kirkpatrick noted that diffuse
weakness was difficult to pin down and now gave him an
impairment rating of 5%.
In May of 1988 a Work Capacity Evaluation was performed that
indicated that his physical manpower characteristic work level
were medium. It was felt that he was feasible for employment.
Neurological evaluation was performed by Alvin Wirthlin on
4/8/86. The doctor saw him specifically because of loss of
control of the left arm and leg over the prior 6 to 8 months.
He had evidence of akinesia, mild mask faces, increased tone
in the left arm, he had a slow gait with shortened steps and
no arm
swing on the left.
The doctor
diagnosed
hemiparkinsonism.
Dr. Wirthlin continued to follow him
through October of 1988. In April of 1986 Dr. Wirthlin made
mention that the relationship between the trauma and the
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Parkinsonism was "fortuitous occurrence."
A repeat MRI
cervical showed degenerative disc disease C5-6, C6-7 with
narrowing of the spinal canal at that level due to osteophytes
and ligamentous hypertrophy.
The patient was placed on
Sinemet which did not cause and change in his condition. At
a time he felt possibly he had more spasticity than rigidity
and then developed what was felt to be some functional
findings on the left side. In October of 1988 he was noted
to have extrapyramidal findings with infrequent blinking and
increased tone on the left side more than the right, gait
disturbance. Nerve conduction studies of the upper and lower
extremities were normal.
Neurological evaluation was performed by neurologist, Richard
Barringer, University Medical Center, 3/9/89. The doctor felt
that he had typical features of Parkinson's Disease, more
marked on the left than the right. He could not explain the
failure to respond to Sinemet, Another trial on Sinemet was
carried out and, again, he had no response. The possibility
of one of the Parkinson Plus Syndromes was considered but felt
to be unlikely.
Dr. Barringer felt this was Parkinson's
Disease. On 7/30/89 Dr. Barringer mentioned that the cause
of the disorder was questionable and he could not exclude the
possibility that I t mi ght be related to a fal J that he
suffered.
Dr. Robert Feldman1s evaluation from Neurological Referral
Center, Inc. in Boston was reviewed a letter to Dr. Barringer
from Dr. Feldman dated 9/13/91. Dr. Feldman noted that at the
time of the injury he had a seal p laceration but no
penetration to the skull and was not unconscious.
He
mentioned tremor of the left index finger that Mr. Broadbent
said began during the hospitalization. His letter mentions
the medication program on which he started Mr. Broadbent which
5

included the current Eldepryl and Sineraet CR.
IME from physiatrist, Richard Thomas, February of 1988. He
gave him an 8% rating for his loss of cervical motion, 2% for
loss of lumbosacral motion plus 5% for his coccygectomy for
a total of 15% impairment.
Physiatrist, John Bender, performed an IME on 9/18/90. He
gave him 15% loss for lumbosacral loss of range of motion, 7%
for loss of cervical range of motion, 5% for the coccygectomy
and 12% for the impairments related to his Parkinson's like
picture. This combined to a total of 34%.
Orthopaedist, Douglas Scow, saw Mr. Broadbent for right
shoulder pain in 1983. He felt he had a contusion strain of
the right shoulder and trapezius muscle without consequence.
PRIOR SPINE COMPLAINTS:
Mr. Broadbent had been seen by chiropractor, Kelley Jarvis,
since 1979, and also by chiropractor Gordon McClean in Provo.
Dr. McClean had seen him since 1977 for an industrial accident
and Dr. Jarvis from 1979 for problems in the spine, mostly mid
thoracic and lumbar. He continues to see Dr. Jarvis about
every 3 weeks for an adjustment.
He feels that the
adjustments last for about 2 to 3 weeks and decreases his pain
by about 50% predominantly in his low back.
CURRENT COMPLAINTS:
He has a left hand tremor that involves minimally the left
leg. On a bad day he is quite shaky and his left side gets
quite rigid. He has increased fatigue. His left arm and left
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leg are weak which he blames on the injury. Functionally he
can tie his laces but it is somewhat difficult. He dresses
slowly. He can button fairly well. He can shave without a
problem. He can slowly get out of a chair but this problem
is due to his back pain and not so much, he feels, his
Parkinson's Disease. He can brush his teeth slowly. He has
no problem with eating.
His writing is fine.
His voice
quality is adequate. Walking up stairs is a problem only due
to low back pain. Walking also is only limited by low back
pain.
Bowel, bladder and sexual function are normal. He
feels he is progressively getting worse. He feels that the
Sinemet helps only a stress like feeling in his body. NECK:
Stiff and he has limited turning. He has intermittent pain
with activity. Frequent extension and flexion will aggravate
this problem.
He has no problems in the dorsal spine.
SHOULDERS: He has spasms under the shoulder blades. DORSAL:
He has pain in that area in the low dorsal region when he
leans forward. He has a constant aching anywhere from a 3 to
a 7. LOW BACK PAIN: He has continuous stiffness in his low
back anywhere between a 5 to a 9 intensity and aggravated by
lifting. He sees Dr. Jarvis every 3 to 4 weeks who relieves
his low back pain to some degree. He has some tingling down
his legs and buttock pain. It is painful for him to sit on
his tail bone which was injured at the time of the accident.
He feels that his left upper extremity is 50% to 75% weaker
and his left lower extremity is 40 to 60% weaker. He has no
loss of feeling. He continues to have the Lhermitte's sign
with tingling down his anterior torso and both lower
extremities and toes when he flexes his neck. This has not
changed since the injury.
HOBBIES:
Horse back riding, hunting and fishing.
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SOCIAL HISTORY:
Married, 2 dependent children at home.
WORK HISTORY:
He returned to work 9 months after the accident.
He is
currently working for Summit county as a building inspector
and has been doing this for 2 and 1/2 years. This job has
worked out quite well.
LEGAL MATTERS:
He is represented in this industrial accident matter by
Attorney, Gene Miller.
EDUCATION:
Two quarters at the University of Utah.
construction work all of his life.

He has done

MILITARY HISTORY:
Two years in the Army.
HABITS:
Alcohol, tobacco denied.
EXAMINATION:
On general inspection he walked with a mildly f estinating gait
without arm swing and slightly stooped. He had a mask like
faces. e^", 190 pounds, right handed.
GENERAL EXAMINATION:
On general examination lungs: clear, heart: no murmurs. Blood
pressure 150/106 right arm.
CRANIAL NERVE EXAMINATION:
Cranial nerves showed full extra-ocular movements and a mild
8

snout reflex. The cranial nerves were otherwise unremarkable.
MOTOR:
Tone was increased in both flexion and extension in all
extremities, more so in the left upper and left lower
extremity.
He had mild cogwheeling of the left upper
extremity.
Reflexes were 3+ and equal throughout.
His
plantar reflexes were down going. Strength: he had give way
strength in the left upper and left lower extremity anywhere
between a 3 to 4/5 loss of function diffusely.
SENSORY:
Intact to pinprick throughout.
CEREBELLAR:
He had a negative head tremor. He had a mild Parkinsonian
tremor involving the left upper and left lower extremity,
especially the former.
Finer to nose was done slowly but
accurately as well as heel to shin. He had difficulty with
repetitive movements, especially in the left hand.
His
handwriting was micrographic.
SHOULDERS:
There was elevation of the proximal clavicle at the right SC
joint. He is also tender of the right acromion . Shoulder
rnage of motion was normal.
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EXTREMITIES:
CIRCUMFERENCES:
UPPER ARMS
FOREARMS
THIGHS
FORELEGS

:IGHT
12
11 3/4
19 1/2
15

LEFT
11
11 1/4
20
15

SPINE:
Axial loading caused no pain
CERVICAL SPINE:
He was 1+ tender CI through C7 and over the right superior
trapezius muscle. The muscles were supple.
RANGE OF MOTION:
Right rotation: 45°, left rotation: 45°, flexion: 35°,
extension: 35°, left and right lateral flexion: 25°.
DORSAL SPINE:
Nontender. There was mild tenderness over the right rhomboid,
35° of right and left rotation.
LUMBOSACRAL SPINE AND COCCYX:
He was tender over L5 and over the stump of the sacrum where
there was a hollowed area and a well healed midline surgical
incision.
WEIGHT BEARING:
Heel toe: normal right, left: poor.
SQUAT:
10

Half squat with difficulty.
LUMBOSACRAL RANGE OF MOTION:
Right: 30°, left: 30°, flexion: 20/14, extension: 15/0.
STRAIGHT LEG RAISING:
Limited only by tight hamstrings at 45° bilaterally.
HIPS:
Full flexion and external and internal rotation.
LEG LENGTHS:
Equal.
X-RAYS:
CERVICAL: Showed mild spondylitic changes as described in the
enclosed report, DORSAL: normal, LUMBOSACRAL: disc space,
narrowing L5-S1 with spur formation. See enclosed report.
RIGHT SHOULDER: Normal. Normal SC joint.
ASSESSMENT:
Mr. Broadbent suffered a significant industrial injury in
October of 1982. The major trauma sustained was, of course,
to his rectum and peroneal area requiring a temporary
colostomy. His coccyx was shattered and was resected. He has
been left with no difficulties with bowel, bladder or sexual
function. He does have some residual pain over the resected
bony stump. Additionally, he has ongoing pain in the spine,
cervical through lumbar. Radiographically, we were able to
identify mild spondylosis of the cervical region and moderate
in the lumbosacral region which has developed over the past
9 years following his injury. He did have problems in his
spine prior to the injury and we had documentation of prior
chiropractic visits.
It appears that the injury has
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aggravated that problem.
The major area of concern here is that of the neurological
consequence of his injury. Though he continues to have what
is called a Lhermitte's sign which is the tingling down the
torso into his legs, flexion of the neck an identifying source
for that problem has never been discovered despite multiple
cervical MRIs and myelograms. In itself, that does not cause
a functional loss but is a sign of usual cervical cord injury
which we have not been able to identify.
The causal
relationship to the accident appears evident, though. An
impairment would not issue from that neurological sign. He
has developed a form of Parkinson's Disease which has been
refractory to the drugs commonly used to treat this condition.
There is no reason to suspect that the trauma that he
sustained in his industrial injury has any bearing on his
Parkinson's features. Parkinson's Disease may issue from
causes other than idiopathic including drug induced, chemical
exposures such as carbon monoxide and presumably also in rare
conditions after severe head injury. We do not have evidence
here of any severe head injury. He had a bump on his head but
without loss of consciousness. The Panel feels that it would
be begging ones credibility to indict his Parkinson's being
due to his industrial accident. Mr. Broadbent feels that
there is a definite relationship because he feels that his
symptomatology of the disease began temporally with the
injury. That may be so, however, the Panel feels that the
production of the symptomatology and the injury remains
coincidental and not causal.
In terms of reasonable medical probability the Panel finds
that:
The Parkinsonfs Disease was not the result of the industrial
12

accident of 10/6/82.
2)

Permanent impairment due ot industrial accident, pre-existing
conditions
and
permanent
aggravation
of
pre-existing
conditions:
PRE-EXISTING 1982
ACCIDENT

CERVICAL SPONDYLOSIS
WITH DECREASED ROM*
LUMBAR SPONDYLOSIS
WITH DECREASED ROM*

3%

COCCYGECTOMY

COMBINED

3%

AGGRAVATION DUE TO
1982 ACCIDENT

TOTAL

10%

10%

7%

10%

5%

5%

21%

23%

*Some loss of ROM is due to underlying Parkinson. Therefore,
not all loss assigned to the spondylosis.

Gerald
GRM/jbl
Tx: 12/16/91

Wallace E. Hess, M.D.
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ATTACHMENT M B M
Order, Administrative Law Judge

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
Case No, 90000918
*

FRED BROADBENT,

*

Applicant,

*

vs•

*

ORDER

*

TOLBOE CONSTRUCTION and/or
INDUSTRIAL INDEMNITY, EMPLOYERS
REINSURANCE FUND,

*
*
*
*

Defendants.

*

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

At the time and place set for the hearing in this matter, it
was stipulated by the parties that the matters in dispute were
medical only and were not factual, and as such would not require an
evidentiary hearing. In addition, the parties, by and through
counsel, agreed that the medical issues could be referred directly
to the Medical Panel for its evaluation.
The file and the applicant were referred to the Medical Panel
for its evaluation. The Panel Report was received and copies were
distributed to the parties. Fifteen(15) days having elapsed since
the mailing of said Medical Panel Report, and no objections having
been received thereto, the Panel Report is hereby admitted into
evidence.
The Medical Panel found that the applicant has sustained a 23%
impairment of the whole person on a combined basis due to the
industrial accident and the aggravation of a pre-existing
condition. The Administrative Law Judge hereby adopts the findings
of the Panel as his own. Pursuant to section 35-1-69 the applicant
shall be entitled to a 20% award from the employer's carrier and
shall receive a 3% impairment from the Employers Reinsurance Fund.
In addition, the carrier, Industrial Indemnity shall be entitled to
reimbursement from the ERF for 3/23 or 13% of the medical expenses
and temporary total disability paid by them on behalf of the
applicant as the result of the industrial accident of October 6,
1982.

FRED BROADBENT
ORDER
PAGE TWO

On the date of his industrial accident the applicant was
earning wages sufficient to entitle him to the maximum award for
permanent partial impairment of $189 per week.
Therefore, the
applicant is entitled to an award from the of $189 per week for
62.4 weeks for a total of $11,793.60 in a lump sum plus interest of
8% per annum from December 23, 1991.
The ERF shall pay the
applicant an award of 9.36 weeks at the rate of $189 per week for
a total of $1,769.04 in a lump sum with 8% interest from December
23, 1991.
The applicant has had the benefit of legal counsel in this
matter and counsel is entitled to a fee of $2,713, which shall be
deducted from the applicant's award.

ORDER:
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Industrial Indemnity pay Fred
Broadbent compensation at the rate of $189 per week for 62.4 weeks
for a total of $11,793.60 as compensation for a 20% impairment of
the person due to the industrial accident of October 6, 1982.
These benefits shall be paid in a lump sum with 8% interest from
December 23, 1991.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Industrial Indemnity pay Eugene C.
Miller, Jr., Attorney for applicant, the sum of $2,713 for services
rendered in this matter, the same to be deducted from the aforesaid
award to the applicant and remitted directly to his office.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Industrial Indemnity shall be
entitled to reimbursement from the ERF for 13% of the ttd and
medical expenses paid by them on behalf of the applicant as the
result of the industrial accident. Said reimbursement to be had
uupon the submission of a verified petition setting forth the
amounts so expended.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the ERF pay Fred Broadbent
compensation at the rate of $189 per week for 9.36 weeks for a
total of $1,769.04 for a 3% permanent partial impairment due to
pre-existing conditions. These benefits shall be paid in a lump
sum with 8% interest from December 23, 1991.
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of
foregoing shall be filed in writing within thirty (30) days of
date hereof, specifying in detail the particular errors
objections, and , unless so filed, this Order shall be final
not subject to review or appeal.

Certified this
7th day of March, 1992.

the
the
and
and

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I certify that on March °f, 1992, a copy of the attached
Order in the case of Fred Broadbent was mailed to the following
persons at the following addresses, postage paid:
Fred Broadbent
2774 E. 1200 So.
Heber City, Utah 84032
Eugene C. Miller, Jr.
Attorney
311 So. State, #240
SLC, Utah 84111
Stuart Poelman, Esq.
P.O. 45000
SLC, Utah 84145
Erie Boorman, Esq.
ERF

INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH

Tim Allen
n
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ATTACHMENT "C"
Denial of Respondent's Motion for Review and Denial
of Applicant's Motions for Review in Part

JUN 0 1 1992
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-6600
Fred Broadbent,

*

Applicant,
vs,

*
*

Tolboe Construction and/or
Industrial Indemnity,
Employers' Reinsurance Fund,
Respondent.

*
*
'
*

DENIAL OF RESPONDENT'S
MOTION FOR REVIEW AND
DENIAL OF APPLICANT'S
MOTIONS FOR REVIEW
IN PART
Case No. 90000918

*********************************

The Industrial Commission of Utah reviews the Motions for
Review of applicant Fred Broadbent and respondents Tolboe
Construction and Industrial Indemnity in the above captioned
matter, pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-82.53 and
Section 63-46b-12.
The applicant and the respondents Tolboe Construction and/or
Industrial Indemnity submitted Motions for Review of the
administrative law judge's (ALJ) decision in the above captioned
case. The applicant submitted two Motions for Review of the ALJ's
decision of March 9, 1992, one on March 18, 1992, and the second
one on April 6, 1992. Both were timely filed.
The above named respondents submitted their response to
applicant7s first motion on April 8, 1992, and also, on that date
timely submitted their Motion for Review. On April 20, 1992, the
applicant responded to respondent's April 8, 1992 reply to
applicant's Motion for Review, and on April 24, 1992 responded to
respondent's Motion for Review. Respondents provided a further
reply on May 12, 1992 to applicant's Motion for Review of April 6,
1992.
All parties need to be aware that responses to motions for
review must be filed with the Commission within 15 days of the
mailing date of the motion for review, or such responses may be
considered untimely. U.C.A. Section 63-46b-12 (1953 as amended
1988) . Since there were untimely responses from all parties, and
because we have received no objections to the untimely filings, we
will consider the responses.
Relevant facts are as follows. The applicant sustained an
industrial accident on October 6, 1982. Tolboe Construction and
Industrial Indemnity paid medical expenses and temporary total
disability benefits (TTD).
The respondents claim that the
applicant refused tender of payment for permanent partial
disability (PPD) due to a disagreement as to the correct PPD
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rating. The tender was made on June 4, 1987.
an application for hearing in October 1990.

The applicant filed

In answer to the hearing application, respondents denied
liability for PPD compensation asserting that the Industrial
Commission of Utah (IC) is precluded from making a PPD award at any
time subsequent to eight years after the date of the accident, and
basing this assertion on U.C.A. Section 35-1-66. By order dated
March 9, 1992, the ALJ awarded the applicant PPD benefits, but did
not address the eight year limitation provision contained in the
statute.
Because of a series of disputes between the parties, and among
the physicians, as to the proper PPD rating, the ALJ referred this
case to a medical panel. On December 10, 1991, the panel awarded
the appliccint a 23 percent impairment rating. The ALJ adopted the
medical panel impairment rating of 2 3 percent, and ordered that the
applicant7s compensation be paid in a lump sum plus interest of
eight percent from December 23, 1991.
The only issue raised in applicant's Motion for Review dated
March 18, 1992 was whether the date of December 23, 1991 was the
proper date for the interest to begin accrual.
The applicant
contends that interest should begin on June 9, 1983 which is the
day after the date upon which the applicant's TTD was terminated.
Alternatively, the applicant argues that if the Commission decides
that the interest should not begin on that date, the interest
clearly should begin on April 23, 1984 which is the date that the
applicant met the standard for a permanent partial impairment
rating of 20 percent.
The respondents argue that the ALJ was correct in ordering
that interest on the PPD award commenced on December 23, 1991 since
that was the date that the liability of the respondents was first
medically determined. We agree with the respondents on this issue.
The Utah Supreme Court has discussed the rationale behind the
award of interest on workers compensation benefits:
Thus, it is clear that compensation for worker
disability is legislation for the public welfare. It is also clear that the statute providing for interest on unpaid benefits was a
legislative attempt to remedy a serious social
problem: the depreciation of the value of benefits as a result of non-receipt of the weekly
benefit for months, or perhaps years, until a
final determination of eligibility and an award
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was made.
Marshall v. Ind. Comm'n, 704 P.2d 581, 583 (Utah 1985).
U.C.A. Section 35-1-78 provides in pertinent part:
Awards made by the Industrial Commission shall include interest at the rate of 8% per annum from
the date when each benefit payment would have
otherwise become due and payable.
1953 as amended 1981.
Further, our rules state that:
For the purpose of interest calculation, benefits
shall become "due and payable" (as used in Section
35-1-78, U.C.A.) as follows:
* * *

2.

Permanent partial compensation shall be
due and payable on the next day following the termination of a temporary total
disability. However, where the condition
is not fixed for rating purposes, the interest shall commence from the date the
permanent partial impairment can be medically determined.

Emphasis added; Rule 490-1-12 (Utah Admin. Code 1991).
There has been no allegation by the applicant of bad faith or
dilatory tactics on the part of the respondents in paying the
interest. Our decision on the award of interest may be different
in cases where the employer cannot show that it proceeded with some
dispatch to provide payments to injured employees who were entitled
to such payments.
Under the circumstances, interest accrues from the date of
December 23, 1991 as correctly determined by the ALJ.
The applicant in his Motion for Review dated April 6, 1992
also argues that he has never received reimbursement for his
travel.
The ALJ Order is silent as to this issue, and the
respondents7 reply to applicants motion argues that the Order did
not contain any consideration of the mileage claim because the
applicant did not submit itemized information reflecting the
particular amounts of mileage expense claimed for the various
periods involved to the ALJ as the ALJ had ordered. The applicant
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has not responded to this allegation of respondents so we will
treat this statement by the respondents as true for purpose of our
decision.
The current pertinent rule which was effective on March 16,
192 provides that:
An employee who, based upon his/her physician's advice, requires hospital, medical,
surgical, or consultant services for injuries arising out of and in the course of
€>mployment and who is authorized by the
self-insurer, the carrier, or the Industrial
Commission to obtain such services from a
physician and or hospital shall be entitled
to [certain reimbursements].
R568-2-19A (Utah Admin. Code 1992).
The rule further provides that n[r]equests for travel
reimbursement must be submitted to the carrier for payment within
one year of the authorized care. R568-2-19B4 (Utah Admin. Code
1992) .
Therefore, such mileage reimbursement requests are
authorized under the current rule as an expense which can be passed
on to the carrier or employer unless the employee does not submit
such request for reimbursement within one year of the authorized
care.
The applicant does not fall under the current rule since he
was injured in 1982, and since he clearly filed his application
before the effective date of the new rule.
Therefore, the
requirement that the applicant submit his requests for travel
reimbursement to the carrier within one year of the authorized care
will apply in his case only to those medical treatments, and other
circumstances within the mileage reimbursement rule which were
incurred subsequent to March 15, 1992.
Carriers should not impose rigid and onerous requirements on
injured employees to prove mileage expenses. Such requirements are
contrary to the spirit of the Workers' Compensation Act. However,
the carrier may reasonably require the injured employee to show
that he/she attended a medical appointment or other required
treatment along with a statement from the injured employee showing
the mileage from the home/work of the employee to the place of
treatment and return.
Rather than the carrier simply stating that the burden has not
been met, it is incumbent upon the carrier to tell the employee
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precisely what will be reasonably needed to substantiate the
reimbursement.
Preferably this should be discussed, among such
items as how the claim will be processed, early in the process when
the carrier assigns an adjuster to the case. Such a discussion
will avoid much of the contention presented by arguments over
mileage as presented in this case.
We do not have sufficient information on which to approve or
disapprove applicant's claim for mileage in this case.
The
applicant has provided us with a list of the mileage amounts
claimed for the various years. Had the applicant provided this
list more punctually, it could have been considered by the ALJ.
However, in the interest of conserving time, we will dispose of
this issue.
The carrier must do more than say that the amounts are old and
unsubstantiated. The applicant has listed the day, month, and year
for most of his trips, the medical practitioner or facility
visited, and the number of miles. The carrier presumably has the
medical records and bills which it paid to verify these trips. It
would seem that sufficient information has been provided on which
the carrier can determine the claim. Since the applicant was late
turning in his claim, the carrier will have ten days from the
issuance of our order in which to provide us more information about
its specific objections, and about what it needs in the way of
substantiation which are not within its records of the case, or we
will approve the amounts claimed.
The remaining issue to be discussed,
issue raised by the respondents in their
whether U.C.A. Section 35-1-66 of the Utah
Act prohibits the Commission from making an
of permanent partial disability after eight
applicant's injury.

and which is the only
Motion for Review is
Workers' Compensation
award to the applicant
years from the date of

The statute in question reads:
The Commission may make a permanent partial
disability award at any time prior to eight
years after the date of injury to an employee whose physical condition resulting
from such injury is not finally healed and
fixed eight years after the date of the injury and who files an application for such
purpose prior to the expiration of such
eight-year period.
Emphasis added. (1953 as amended 1981).
The ALJ Issued his decision more than nine years after the
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date of injury. This precludes the Commission from ordering
respondents to pay an award of permanent partial disability to
applicant argue the respondents. To buttress this argument,
respondents further contend that the delay in seeking
Commission/s award was caused by the applicant.

the
the
the
the

The use of the word "may" clearly shows that the Commission is
not required to make such award within the eight year period,
although it may do so. This particular statute is applicable to
those situations where the applicants condition has not
stabilized, but the applicant desires that his medical condition be
rated even though under normal circumstances no rating would be
provided until stabilization.
Under these circumstances, such
applicant can force a rating if requested prior to the expiration
of the eight year period.
In this case, the applicant clearly filed his application
before the eight year period.
For these reasons, the Commission affirms the ALJ's decision.
There is substantial evidence in light of the entire record to
uphold the* findings of the ALJ, and his conclusions of law are
appropriate under the circumstances.
ORDER:
IT IS ORDERED that the order of the administrative law judge
dated March 9, 1992 is affirmed.
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the respondents shall have ten
days from the date of issuance of this Order to provide to the
Commission any specific objections to the mileage reimbursement
request shown at Exhibit A, Applicant's Motion for Review filed on
April 6, 1992. The applicant shall have ten days from the date of
service upon him to respond to respondent's objections, if any.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any appeal shall be to the Utah
Court of Appeals within 30 days of the date hereof, pursuant to
Utah Code Annotated, Sections 35-1-82.53(2), 35-1-86, and 63-46b16. The requesting party shall bear all costs to prepare a
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transcript of the hearing for appeals purposes,
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